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INTRODUCTION

On April 2, 1990, around 7:45 p.m., Dr. Humberto AlvarezMachain was relaxing in his office in Guadalajara, Mexico, having
just finished treating a patient. Suddenly, five or six armed men
burst into his office. One showed him a badge that appeared to be
that of the Mexican federal police. Another placed a gun to Dr.
Alvarez-Machain's head and told him to cooperate "or he would
be shot."' The men then took Dr. Alvarez-Machain to a house
where he was forced to lie on the floor facedown for two or three
hours. His captors shocked him several times with an "electric
shock apparatus" and injected him twice with a substance that
made him feel "light-headed and dizzy."' Later, Dr. AlvarezMachain was transported by car to Leon, where he and his captors boarded a plane headed for El Paso, Texas. When they arrived in El Paso on April 3, agents of the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) were waiting to arrest Dr. Alvarez-Machain 3 for
his alleged involvement in the 1986 torture and murder of DEA
agent Enrique Camarena."

1. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 603 (C.D. Cal. 1990), affd sub
nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S.Ct.
2188 (1992).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. The indictment returned against Dr. Alvarez-Machain charged him with conspiracy to commit violent acts and violent acts in furtherance of an enterprise engaged in
racketeering activity (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1959 (1988)), conspiracy to kidnap a federal agent
(18 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (1988)), kidnapping a federal agent (18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(5) (1988)),
and felony murder (18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(a), 1114 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188, 2190 n.1 (1992). On December 14, 1992, after Dr.
Alvarez-Machain's case was remanded to the district court, that court acquitted Dr. Alvarez-Machain of all charges and ordered his release on the ground that the government
had failed to establish a prima facie case. Manuel R. Angulo & James D. Reardon, Jr.,
The Apparent Political and Administrative Expediency Exception Established by the Su-
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The kidnapping of Dr. Alvarez-Machain from Mexico was a

state-sponsored international abduction. The United States,
through its paid agents, removed a foreign national from his country and brought him to the United States to stand trial. International abduction is not a recent phenomenon; incidents of such
conduct can be found as early as 1835' and have occurred fairly

consistently worldwide throughout the last 160 years.6 Although
extradition treaties abound,7 their procedures are cumbersome,
and they are often ineffective tools for attaining jurisdiction over
an individual.' As a result, governments have sometimes resorted
to extraterritorial apprehension and arrest in order to obtain jurisdiction over wanted individuals, and there is little reason to believe that such conduct will not continue in the future.9
preme Court in United States v. Humberto Alvarez-Machain to the Rule of Law as Reflected by Recognized Principles of International Law, 16 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
245, 284 (1993).
5. State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118 (1835).
6. A short list of reported cases involving abductions in which the United States
has been a party includes Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981); United
States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975);
United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Insull, 8 F.
Supp. 310 (N.D. Ill. 1934); and United States v. Unverzagt, 299 F. 1015 (W.D. Wash.
1924), affd sub nom. Unverzagt v. Benn, 5 F.2d 492 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 566
(1925).
7. The United States, for example, has extradition treaties with 103 nations. U.S.
Has No Need for Official Kidnappings, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 16, 1993, at A1O.
8. Some states do not possess an effective police force and cannot locate persons
within their boundaries, and thus cannot honor requests for extradition. In addition, many
extradition treaties do not provide for the extradition of nationals. For example, the U.S.France Extradition Treaty of 1909 stated that "neither of the contracting Parties shall be
bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects under the stipulations of this convention." Valentine v. United States ex rel Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 7 (1936) (quoting Extradition Treaty of 1909, Jan. 6, 1909, U.S.-Fr., art. 5, 37 Stat. 1526)); see also, e.g., Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., art. 9, 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5065 (containing similar
provision). Other problems include the fact that extradition treaties may become suspended due to a break in the diplomatic relations between the signatory states and the fact
that an extradition treaty might not permit extradition for the specific crime for which a
state seeks extradition. Richard Downing, Note, The Domestic and InternationalLegal Implications of the Abduction of Criminals from Foreign Soil, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 573, 576
(1990).
9. Consider, for example, the following hypothetical abduction suggested by Professor Abraham Abramovsky:
As the night turns into morning, four heavy-set men burst into Aramco's corporate headquarters in Houston, Texas, and point an AK-47 at the head of
Aramco's CEO. "Do as you're told and nobody will get hurt," they explain,
and they deposit him in the back of a waiting automobile. The captive is informed that he is under indictment for complicity in plundering of natural re-
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The relative frequency of international abductions notwithstanding, it is widely accepted that such abductions violate some of
the most basic tenets of international law. Indeed, it is well settled
that international law prohibits a state from exercising its sovereignty in the territory of another state."0 International law simply
does not permit a state to send officials or agents into the territory of another state to either kidnap or arrest a person from that
state. 1 Such abductions have been condemned not only by the
states from which the persons have been seized, but also by the
international community at large. 2
Nonetheless, the agreement that these abductions violate
international law has not generated any corresponding scholarly
consensus as to the appropriate remedy for the violation. Although their conclusions rest on varied premises, several scholars
have argued that the return of the individual is not an accepted
customary international law remedy. Professor Bassiouni, for example, writes that "[t]he only established remedies are reparations
and diplomatic apologies; the additional remedy of the return of
the person seized unlawfully is not yet recognized, although some
courts have seen fit to apply it."' 3 Underlying this conclusion apsources from the Rumaila oil fields in violation of the sovereignty of Iraq. The
four abductors tie the astonished CEO up and beat him about the head and
body with blunt instruments. They smuggle him into Iran with the acquiescence
of Iranian authorities, and with their assistance he is placed under arrest by
Iraqi law enforcement agents. Finally, they bring him before a court in Baghdad, where he is accorded all the due process rights to which he is entitled
under Iraqi criminal law and promptly sentenced to prison. The U.S. State Department adamantly protests his apprehension and capture as a violation of U.S.
sovereignty and territorial integrity, but the Iraqis respond with nothing less
than unqualified scorn. Meanwhile, a U.S. citizen finds himself alone in the
vagaries of the Iraqi criminal justice system.
Abraham Abramovsky, ExtraterritorialAbductions: America's "Catch and Snatch" Policy
Run Amok, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 151, 151 (1991); see also D. Cameron Findlay, Abducting
Terrorists Overseas for Trial in the United States: Issues of International and Domestic
Law, 23 TEX. INT'L LJ.1, 16 (1988).
10. See infra Section I(A).
11. Id.
12. See S.C. Res. 138, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., Supp. for Apr.-June 1960, at 35, U.N.
Doe. S14349 (1960). In response to the Israeli abduction of Nazi war criminal Adolf
Eichmann from Argentina, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution in which it
"[d]eclare[d] that acts such as those under consideration which affect the sovereignty of a
member state and therefore cause friction, may, if repeated, endanger international peace
and security."
13. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,

INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW

AND PRACTICE 217 (1987). Ironically, however, the very cases used by Bassiouni to conclude that international law does not require the return of the abducted individual were
cited by the Supreme Court in the Alvarez-Machain case in noting that such conduct
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pears to be the implicit assumption either that there are not
enough cases of return to make it an accepted remedy or that in

cases in which the abducting state has chosen to return the individual, it has not believed that it was legally obligated to do so."

Similarly, Jonathan Bush argues that "[tiraditional international
law[ fails] to provide remedies for victims"15 and that an "ag-

grieved country [does] not enjoy a remedy as of right, but only if
compliance benefits the offending country."' 6 According to Bush,
there is an "absence of a principled distinction between cases

where a remedy is obtained and those lacking a remedy." 7 Consequently, disparate results are explained by the political interests

involved in each case." Finally, Andreas Lowenfeld has noted
that arguments for the return of the individual "have succeeded

only intermittently, and usually in a semipolitical, semilegal context."1 9
Other scholars have argued, however, that the return of the

abducted individual is required under international law.2' As early
as 1935, Lawrence Preuss argued that "[s]uch a violation of for-

eign territory undoubtedly engages the responsibility of the state
of arrest, which is under a clear duty to restore the prison-

"may show the practice of nations under customary international law." United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 n.15 (1992).
14. But see infra Section III.
15. Jonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction After AlvarezMachain, 45 STAN. L. REV. 939, 947 (1993).
16. Id. at 948.
17. Id. at 947.
18. This Note takes issue with Bush's conclusion and argues that there are basic
principled distinctions that can and must be drawn among international abduction cases.
As discussed later, most international abduction cases do not involve any breach of international law and therefore the issue of "remedy" is irrelevant. For example, neither the
abduction of Ker nor that of Eichmann, incidents that Bush uses to illustrate his point
that international law does not recognize any "remedy," id. at 948, involved any breach
of international law that required repatriation. See infra note 26.
19. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 444,
475 (1990).
20. See Keith Highet & George Kahale III, International Decisions, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 811, 815 (1992); Claire E. Lewis, Unlawfid Arrest: A Bar to the Juridiction of the
Court, or Mala Captus Bene Detentus? Sidney Jaffe: A Case in Point, 28 CRIM. L.Q.
341, 368 (1985-1986); Felice Morgenstern, Jurisdiction in Seizures Effected in Violation of
International Law, 29 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 265, 265 (1952); Paul O'Higgins, Unlawful
Seizure and Irregular Extradition, 36 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 279, 293 (1960) ("British practice is in accordance with the principle that in case of apprehension in violation of international law there is an obligation upon the arresting state to restore the person arrested.").
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er...."2 Preuss argued further that "[t]his obligation [to restore
the abducted person] appears to have been almost uniformly acknowledged in cases where the injured State has made a diplomatic reclamation."' Similarly, F.A. Mann has written that "[t]he
normal and generally accepted remedy in the event of a wrongful
abduction is the return of the victim." 3
This Note examines the historical cases of state-sponsored
international abduction and argues that customary international
law requires the remedy of restitutio in integrum;24 that is, when
an asylum state that did not in any manner partake in the abduction protests the kidnapping and demands return, the abducting
state is obligated to return the individual to the asylum state. 2 In
addition, this Note argues that United States courts have misconstrued their own power in holding that they are unable to effect
this remedy. Because there is no United States law, either statutory or judicially created, that directly bars a district court from
ordering the return of an abducted individual, United States courts
have the power to order the return of a person based on the force
of international law within United States law.26 Part I of this

21.
AM. J.
22.
23.

Lawrence Preuss, Kidnapping of Fugitives from Justice on Foreign Territory, 29
INT'L L. 502, 505 (1935).
Id.
F.A. Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of

International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 411 (Yoram

Dinstein ed., 1989).
24. "In the civil law, restoration or restitution to the previous condition." BLACK'S
LAW DIcIoNARY 1313 (6th ed. 1990).
25. In this Note, the term "asylum state" refers to the state from which an individual was taken; the term "abducting state" refers to the state that committed the abduction.
26. Generally, national courts have not directly addressed the international law issues
discussed in this Note. Instead, they have considered the issue of international abduction
solely in terms of their jurisdiction over the abducted individual. They simply have not
framed the issue as a question of the international responsibility of the state for the abduction. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 443 (1886); Re Argoud, 45 I.L.R. 90 (Cass.
Crim. 1964) (Fr.); Abrahams v. Minister of Justice, 1963 (4) SA 542 (S.Afr.), reprinted
in S. Afr. L. Rep. (1963); Ex Parte Scott, 109 Eng. Rep. 166 (K.B. 1829). In virtually
every case, the national court has held that jurisdiction is not affected by the circumstances of the apprehension. Representative of this position is the language of the district court of Israel in the Eichmann case. It stated that
[t]he Courts in England, the United States and Israel have constantly held that
the circumstances of the arrest and the mode of bringing of the accused into
the territory of the State have no relevance to his trial, and they have consistently refused in all instances to enter upon an examination of these circumstances.
Attorney Gen. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18, 59 (Isr. Dist. Ct. 1961); see also Ker, 119 U.S.
at 444 ("There are authorities of the highest respectability which hold that such forcible
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abduction is no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when brought within
the jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him for such an offence . . . ").
The language of these cases appears to suggest that even in cases of a violation of
international law, the exercise of jurisdiction is allowed, and therefore that international
law imposes no duty of return. However, the broad language used by these courts was
not justified by the circumstances of those specific abductions. With the exception of the
well-known Eichmann case, none of these widely cited cases involved a breach of international law sufficient to give rise to state responsibility. In Ker, the abduction was committed by a private individual, Ker, 119 U.S. at 443 ("IT]he facts show that it was a clear
case of kidnapping .. . without any pretence of authority .. . from the government of
the United States."); in Ex Parte Scott, Abrahams, and Re Argoud, there was no evidence
that the asylum state ever protested the arrest on its territory. In Eichmann, although the
Israeli abduction from Argentina clearly violated international law, Argentina explicitly
waived its right to assert responsibility:
By the joint decision of the Governments of Argentina and Israel of August 30,
1960 "to regard as closed the incident that arose out of the action taken by
citizens of Israel, which infringed the fundamental right of the State of Argentina," the country whose sovereignty was violated has waived its claims, including
its claim for the return of the accused, and any violation of international law
which might have been involved in the "incident" has been "cured."
Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 70. Consequently, these cases' conclusions that jurisdiction exists
regardless of the facts of the extraterritorial abduction (i.e., even if there was a breach of
international law) are pure dicta.
Given that there was no violation of international law in these cases, these courts
were arguably correct in asserting jurisdiction over the accused. However, these cases certainly do not constitute authority for the broader proposition that jurisdiction exists in all
cases or that international law does not impose a duty of return. The apparent tension
between the duty of the abducting state to repatriate the individual and the power and
apparent "right" of the domestic court to assert jurisdiction thus may not be as severe as
the language of these cases suggests. In short, these cases do not establish that mala captus, bene detentus ("wrongfully taken, rightfully held") is the governing international norm
in cases of international abduction in violation of international law. See Aaron Schwabach
& S.A. Patchett, Doctrine or Dictum: The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine and Official Abductions
Which Breach International Law, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 19, 50-53 (1993).
Conceptually, moreover, there is a distinction between the issue of jurisdiction over
an accused and the question of international law remedies. The first is concerned with
the power of the domestic court over the individual, the second with the legal obligation
of the state entity in its relations with other states. Therefore, the existence of jurisdiction
in certain cases of state-sponsored international abduction in violation of international law
does not compel the conclusion that international law does not demand return of the
individual. Rather, it merely acknowledges that the power of domestic courts is not
abridged by the requirements of international law in these particular domestic legal systems.
It could be the case that even if a domestic court could exercise jurisdiction, international law would impose a duty of return on the state entity. This obligation could be
discharged in any manner that the state's internal legal or political processes allow. Thus,
for example, in the event that the domestic court could not effectuate the international
law remedy, the burden of compliance would then rest with the executive or legislative
branch. In this sense, the power of a domestic court to exercise jurisdiction and the requirements of international law are not diametrically opposed. If, however, the domestic
law of a state does not require the exercise of jurisdiction and allows a court to take
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Note addresses the issue of state responsibility in cases of international abduction. It discusses the types of conduct that create
responsibility for the abducting state and give rise to the obligation of returning the individual. It also considers the factors that
may exculpate a state and preclude the asylum state from asserting responsibility. Part II considers the issue of remedies under
international law. Part III argues that in the specific context of
state-sponsored international abduction, state practice, as evidenced by diplomatic protests and reclamations, and by some
national court judgments, firmly reflects an international custom of
repatriating the abducted individual to the asylum state. Part IV
discusses the power of United States courts to effectuate return of
the individual and to make the United States comply with its international law obligations.27
I.

STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL ABDUCTIONS

A. The Violation of InternationalLaw by InternationalAbductions
International law is composed of both "primary" and
"secondary" legal principles. Primary principles are those that establish the legality or illegality of state conduct or the content of
the obligations that delimit the permissible range of state action.28
As the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State
Responsibility note, "primary" rules are those that "defin[e] the
rules of international law which, in one or another sector of interState relations, impose specific obligations on States .. ."29 The
law of state responsibility is not one of these primary rules; rather,
notice of, and administer, international law, then declining to exercise jurisdiction may
simply constitute a shortcut for bringing the state into compliance with its international
legal obligations without having to rely on the executive or legislative branch.
In short, the principle of mala captus, bene detentus has not been established in

cases in which the abduction violated international law. Even if one assumes that the
cases cited above did establish that jurisdiction existed despite a breach of international
law, this merely resolves a question of the domestic court's power; it does not resolve the
question of the proper international law remedy.
27. The scope of this Note is limited to the customary international law remedy of
states in cases of state-sponsored international abduction. It does not venture into the
issue of what international human rights issues are raised by such abductions.
28. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL, LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 202
(1991).
29.

THE

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

COMMISSION'S

DRAFT

ARTICLES

ON

RESPONSIBILITY 39 (Shabtai Rosenne ed., 1991) [hereinafter DRAFT ARTICLES].

STATE

INTERNATIONAL ABDUCTION
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it consists of those secondary legal principles that are "concerned

with determining the legal consequences of failure to fulfill obligations established by the 'primary' rules."' The law of state responsibility thus encompasses both the obligation to effect a suitable remedy for a violation of international law and the nature of
the remedy itself.3 ' As Ian Brownlie has written, "In international

relations as in other social relations, the invasion of the legal
interest of one subject of the law by another legal person creates
responsibility in various forms determined by the particular legal
system."'32 More specifically, "in principle an act or omission
which produces a result which is on its face a breach of a legal
obligation gives rise to responsibility in international law, whether33
the obligation rests on treaty, custom, or some other basis."
This principle is reflected in article 1 of the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility, which states that "[e]very internationally
wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of
that State."' According to the official commentary, this article
reflects "[t~he principle that any conduct of a State which inter-

30. Id.; see id. at 40 ("[I]t is one thing to define a rule and the obligation it imposes, and another to determine whether there has been a breach of that obligation and
what should be the consequences of the breach."); J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 294 (10th ed. 1989); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The International Law of
State Responsibility: Revolution or Evolution?, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 105, 105 (1989) ("The
origin of the responsibility arose in the commission of a wrongful act by a state, in particular, an act or omission by the state violating to its international obligation vis-A-vis
another state.").
31. See 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 901 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS]
("Under international law, a state that has violated a legal obligation to another state is
required to terminate the violation and, ordinarily, to make reparation, including in appropriate circumstances restitution or compensation for loss or injury."); Inter-American
Juridical Comm., Legal Opinion on the Decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the
Alvarez-Machain Case, 13 HuM. RTS. L.J. 395, 397 (1992) ("Pursuant to the rules governing state responsibility in international law, any state that violates an international obligation must make reparations for the consequences of the violation."); see also IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 434 (4th ed. 1990) ("Responsibility is the necessary corollary of a right. All rights of an international character involve international responsibility. If the obligation in question is not met, responsibility
entails the duty to make reparation."); CLYDE EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (1928) ("Responsibility is simply the principle which
establishes an obligation to make good any violation of international law producing inju-

ry ...
32.
33.
34.

").
BROWNLIE, supra note 31, at 432.
Id. at 436.
DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 29, art. 1, at 43.
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national law characterizes as a wrongful act entails the responsibility of that State in international law ...."'
It is a well-established primary rule of international law that
no state may exercise its police power in the territory of another
state without the consent of the host state.36 Thus, for example,
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States provides that "[a] state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the territory of another state only with the
consent of the other state, given by duly authorized officials of
that state."37
It is clear, therefore, that when a state orders its officials into
the territory of a foreign state to apprehend an individual without
the consent of the asylum state, it violates this principle of international law. 38 A state also violates this principle when it employs
or encourages others to undertake official policy on its behalf. For
example, article 8 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility
states that "[t]he conduct of a person or group of persons shall
also be considered as an act of the State under international law
if ... it is established that such person or group of persons was in
fact acting on behalf of that State . . . ."' A corollary to this

35. Id.
36. BROWNLIE, supra note 31, at 85; Letter from Lord Monck to Lord Lyons (May
22, 1863), in 1 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 559

(1863) ("It appears clear that .. . two men .. . were removed by force from the State

of Michigan to Canada by Canadian constables acting on their own responsibility, and
that undoubtedly an infraction of the rights of the United States government was committed by them." (emphasis added)); see also Mann, supra note 23, at 407 n.2 (noting that
the proposition is "elementary"); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE
295 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) ("A State must not perform acts of sovereignty in the territory of another State.").
37.

1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 432(2) (1987).

38. OPPENHEIM, supra note 36, at 295 n.1 ("It is therefore a breach of International
Law for a State to send its agents to the territory of another State to apprehend persons
accused of having committed a crime."); Lewis, supra note 20, at 343-44 ("The involvement of officials of one country in the crime of kidnapping on the territory of another is
a violation of territorial sovereignty ....");O'Higgins, supra note 20, at 280; see also
Abramovsky, supra note 9, at 194 ("[A]bduction violates the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the asylum state.").
39. DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 29, art. 8, at 85. According to the commentary to
article 8, responsibility may arise due to "the conduct of persons . . .or groups of person who have in particular circumstances acted in fact on behalf of the state without,

however, having been formally appointed as organs for that purpose under the State's
legal system." Id. Thus, under the terms of the Draft Articles, actions by persons operating with a mandate from their state give rise to state responsibility. See BASSIOUNI, supra

note 13, at 216 ("[Ilt is clear that state responsibility attaches to acts committed by
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principle, however, is that purely "private" abductions do not give
rise to a claim of state responsibility. In S. v. Ebrahim, for example, the South African court stated,
It is clear from the authorities in English and in American law
that the distinction made ... between an unlawful abduction
made by a private citizen of a person abroad and an abduction
made with the connivance of the South African State or its officials is sound and logical. The latter is objectionable because it
affects the comity of nations and the international obligations of
sovereign States, the former does not.'

agents of a state or by private individuals acting for or on behalf of the state.");
BROWNLIE, supra note 31, at 160-61; STARKE, supra note 30, at 307.
40. S v. Ebrahim, 1991 (2) SA 553, 559 (S. Aft.), reprinted in S. Afr. L. Rep. (Apr.June 1991). One defense that states have repeatedly asserted in abduction cases is that

the kidnapping was carried out by "private persons." In the case of Jacob Solomon, a
German dmigr6 who was kidnapped in Switzerland and brought to Germany, the German
government initially argued that since there was no evidence that German authorities had
participated in the abduction, the government had not violated international law. Preuss,
supra note 21, at 504. Similarly, the United States asserted this defense in the Martinez
incident, when an individual was taken from Mexico to the United States. Letter from
Robert Bacon to Balbino Davalos (June 22, 1906), in 2 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1121, 1122 (1906).
A problem that therefore arises in this context is ascertaining which individuals

should be considered state agents for purposes of determining state responsibility. It is
beyond the scope of this Note, however, to examine the circumstances in which actions
by ostensibly private persons might give rise to state responsibility. For a general discussion of "[w]hat can be identified as the machinery of the state," see IAN BROWNLIE,
SYSTEM OF LAW OF NATIONS 135-37 (1983). For a discussion of state responsibility issues in the context of "private" bounty hunters, see Perry J. Seaman, Comment, International Bountyhunting: A Question of State Responsibility, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 397
(1985).
A related issue is the problem posed by "ratification." It has been argued that
when a state subsequently prosecutes an individual kidnapped by "private" persons, it
"ratifies" the acts of the private individuals and thereby gives rise to a claim of state
responsibility. See Mann, supra note 23, at 408. Although Mann's point is well taken, two
factors argue against his conclusion. First, no case or instance has been found in which a
state has argued that the subsequent prosecution of an individual abducted gives rise to
state responsibility. Therefore, state practice does not appear to support this position.
Second, since the violation of the asylum state's territorial sovereignty is the underlying
wrong, it is difficult to argue that prosecution alone creates responsibility. The prosecution itself does not violate the sovereignty of the asylum state or violate international
law. Therefore, it would not seem sufficient, in and of itself, to give rise to state responsibility.
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Defenses to Claims of State Responsibility for InternationalAbductions

Even when a state's actions would normally create responsibility for an international abduction, certain circumstances may exonerate the state.4' The Draft Articles on State Responsibility provide for several situations in which otherwise wrongful acts do not
give rise to state responsibility. These exceptions include situations
involving consent, 42 legitimate countermeasures,43 force majeure,4 distress, 4 necessity, 46 and self-defense.4 7

Although these defenses may or may not be applicable in any
particular instance,' the issue of consent is central to nearly every case of state-sponsored international abduction. If the asylum
state permits a foreign state to exercise its police power in the
asylum state's territory, then no issue of state responsibility arises.
State practice suggests that in addition to explicit consent, implicit
consent may be a defense: if a competent asylum state official partakes in the arrest, even if this arrest is illegal under asylum state
law, this involvement is sufficient to constitute consent and to
preclude any assertion of responsibility by the asylum state. 49 In

41.
42.

SCHACHTER, supra note 28, at 203.
DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 29, art. 29, at 313.

43. Id. art. 30, at 319.
44. Id. art. 31, at 326.
45. Id. art. 32, at 337.
46. Id. art. 33, at 351.
47. Id. art. 34, at 369.
48. With the exception of consent, it is beyond the scope of this Note to consider
the possible application of these general exculpatory principles to the specific context of
international abduction. The extent of at least some of these principles has generated
considerable debate. The former legal advisor to the U.S. State Department, Judge
Sofaer, for example, has suggested that the right of self-defense might provide justification for international abductions in some circumstances. FBI Authority to Seize Suspects
Abroad: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 34-38 (1989) (statement of Abraham D.
Sofaer, Legal Advisor, Department of State); see Findlay, supra note 9, at 29-33. However, a 1980 memorandum opinion of the U.S. Department of Justice concluded that "there
[do not] appear to be any doctrines of self-help or self-defense applicable in th[e] context
[of state-sponsored international abduction]." 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 543, 549 (1980).
For the purposes of this Note, it suffices to observe that the scope and limits of these
exculpatory provisions will continue to evolve. In general, moreover, these defenses may
be available to a state in any particular case.
49. DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 29, art. 29, at 316:
[In cases involving arrests by organs of one State of persons who were in the
territory of another State, it has sometimes been held that the action of the
local police in co-operating in the arrest constituted, in those cases, a form of
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United States v. Sobell, for example, the U.S. district court held

that when the Mexican police were involved in an abduction from
Mexico, the abductee's argument that he should be released was
"blocked ... by the rule that even a diplomatic demand for the

return of an illegally seized fugitive need not be honored ' 50where
officials of the asylum state took part in the illegal seizure.

Moreover, the level of authority possessed by the asylum state
official has generally been considered irrelevant in determining
whether the state consented to the abduction. Thus, the complicity
of even a very minor official has been considered sufficient. In the
case of Savarkar, for example, a British prisoner escaped from a
British ship while it was docked at a French port. A French constable who saw the prisoner escaping promptly apprehended him
and returned him to the vessel. When France brought an action in
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the court held that the in-

volvement of this French official precluded any finding that French
sovereignty was violated.-'
Even if a state does not consent to acts that give rise to a
claim of responsibility, it may nonetheless waive its rights to such
a claim after a breach. Waiver occurs when a state forgoes "the
right to assert responsibility and the claims arising therefrom."52
consent-tacit, but incontestable-by the territorial State and that, consequently,
there had been no violation of the territorial sovereignty of that State.
See also Preuss, supra note 21, at 507 (noting that there is "no obligation to surrender
the prisoner when officials of the state of asylum have participated in the irregular...
arrest").
50. United States v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp. 515, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), affd, 244 F.2d
520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957). Similarly, in United States ex rel. Lujan
v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975), the Second
Circuit suggested that the involvement of Bolivian authorities in the arrest of the defendant in Bolivia precluded any finding that a violation of international law had occurred.
51. Savarkar Case (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 275, 279 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1911). Brownlie notes that "[iut is now generally accepted that the position of an official
in the internal hierarchy has no relevance to the question of state responsibility."
BROWNLIE, supra note 40, at 134. It would therefore appear entirely logical to deduce
that the complicity of even a very minor asylum state official in an international abduction would be sufficient to constitute consent of the asylum state and destroy any claim
of state responsibility.
52. DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 29, art. 29, at 317. Black's Law Dictionary distinguishes between the two concepts as follows: consent is "[w]illingness in fact that an act
or invasion of an interest shall take place," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 305 (6th ed.
1990); waiver is the "intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right," id. at
1580. Moreover, waiver occurs when one "does or forbears to do something the doing of
which or the failure of forbearance to do which is inconsistent with the right, or his
intention to rely upon it." Id.
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Thus, the asylum state may opt not to press its claim and demand
an appropriate remedy for the breach. In the context of international abduction, the question is whether waiver can be inferred
from a failure of the asylum state to protest the abduction or to
demand reparation for the violation of its sovereignty. F.A. Mann
has argued that waiver must be explicit: "It is submitted that if the
State does or says nothing, the illegality remains. It is impossible
to infer consent from silence or inactivity." 3 Although Mann's
position may represent good policy, both logic and state practice
suggest that in the context of state-sponsored international abduction, waiver of the right to assert responsibility may properly be
inferred from silence or inaction.
This conclusion follows from the fact that once an international wrong has been committed, the aggrieved state must assert responsibility if it desires that the delinquent state discharge its obligation.' Thus, if a state does not act to seek redress, it would
seem permissible to conclude that the state has waived its right to
a remedy, even if it has not consented to the underlying wrongful
act." Indicative of this position is comment (c) of section 432 of
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations which states,
If the unauthorized action includes abduction of a person, the
state from which the person was abducted may demand return of
the person, and international law requires that he be returned. If
the state from which the person was abducted does not demand
his return,' under the prevailing view the abducting state may
proceed to prosecute him under its laws.56
This conclusion is also firmly supported by state practice. In the
United States, for example, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, held that "a nation may consent to the removal
of an individual from its territory ... after the fact, by failing to
protest a kidnapping....
Because the kidnapping violates the
nation's rights ... the nation may waive those rights."" Addition53. Mann, supra note 23, at 409.
54. See 2 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 902(1) (1987) ("A state may
bring a claim against another state for a violation of an international obligation ..
(emphasis added)).
55. There is an issue of how much time must elapse before a state may conclude
that the asylum state has waived its right to a remedy. This issue, however, would appear to be a question of fact for the court to evaluate in light of all the relevant facts
and circumstances, rather than a matter of international law.
56. 2 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 432 cmt. c.
57. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1991) (empha-
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ally, in Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, the Seventh Circuit held that
"[w]ithout an official protest, we cannot conclude that Honduras
has objected to Matta's arrest."58 The French Cour de Cassation
reasoned similarly in Re Argoud. 9 In that case, Argoud, a French
national, had been sentenced to death in 1961 in absentia for his
participation in illegal political activities.' In 1963, Argoud was
abducted from a Munich hotel room and taken to Paris, where he
was subsequently arrested.6' Argoud argued that since his abduction violated international law, he should be returned to West
Germany. 2 The court rejected his plea and suggested that West
Germany's inaction constituted a waiver of any rights it might
have as a result of the abduction. The court stated, "[E]ven accepting that Argoud had been abducted on the territory of the
Federal Republic of Germany in violation of the rights of that
country and of its sovereignty, it would be for the Government of
the injured State alone to complain and demand reparation."'
Israeli courts also have adopted this position, as evidenced by the
holding of the supreme court in the Eichmann case that "such
waiver may be explicit or by acquiescence. ' 4 The Canadian government also seems to support this view. In its amicus brief to the
U.S. Supreme Court in the Alvarez-Machain case, it stated that in
the case of an abduction from the United States to Canada, the
"Government of Canada would, upon protest, cooperate to obtain
the return of an abducted fugitive."'65 The United Kingdom
ses added), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992).

58. Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 260 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
878 (1990). In United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 520 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975), the Second Circuit also stressed the importance of a protest
by the asylum state. It noted that neither Argentina nor Bolivia had protested the
defendant's abduction, which suggested that these countries had opted to waive their right
to assert responsibility.
59. Re Argoud, 45 I.L.R. 90 (Cass. Crim. 1964) (Fr.).

60. Id. at 91.
61. Id. at 92.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 97. Similarly, the
same case, that "[tihe individual
to plead in judicial proceedings
concerned makes no claim." Id.
64.

special court of state security had previously held, in the
who claims to be injured . . . lacks the right or capacity
a violation of international law, a fortiori when the state
at 94.

Attorney Gen. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 305 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962) (affirming the

conclusions of the district court).
65. Brief of the Canadian Government as Amicus Curiae at 3, United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (No. 91-712), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File [hereinafter Canadian Brief] (emphasis added).
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courts' and the Mexican government also agree on this point.'
In general, therefore, state practice supports the conclusion that if
a state fails to protest an abduction from its territory, the abducting state may infer that the asylum state has waived its right to
assert a claim of responsibility for the otherwise unlawful act.
II.

REMEDIES IN CASES OF INTERNATIONAL ABDUCrION

A. The Remedy of Restitutio in Integrum
In his treatment of the law of state responsibility, Ian
Brownlie has questioned whether it is appropriate to determine
the proper international law remedy for any specific violation of a
primary rule by relying predominantly on general remedial principles:
In considering issues of state responsibility, the relation between
duties and forms of relief,... is it really worthwhile to launch
upon such consideration with the unargued premiss that the purpose must be the statement of generally applicable and autonomous sets of principles relating to "state responsibility," "justifications," and so on? Is it not the case that it is the nature and
content of the particularduty which determines these quality of
the other matters... ?68
Brownlie thus suggests that the more logical approach is to recognize the integral relation between the specific type of wrong and
the appropriate remedy. Thus, a remedy that is fully adequate and
appropriate in one context and for one type of wrong may at the
same time be wholly inapposite in another. Although Brownlie is
1

66. See, e.g., R. v. Garrett, 86 LJ.K.B. 894, 900 (1917) (emphasis added):
The men were arrested, not in violation of the law of any other country, as the
foreign or neutral vessel was in a British port by agreement. No complaint was
made by the neutral State or any other State concerned. These being the facts,
the case of Scott, ex parte which has been alluded to, applies.
See also the opinion of the Law Officers in the Lawler case: "[W]e deem it to be a duty
of the State ...

to restore the aggrieved State, upon its request to that effect

. . .

to its

original position." O'Higgins, supra note 20, at 295 (quoting Lord McNair) (emphasis
added). See generally infra text accompanying notes 148-50 for a discussion of the Lawler
case.
67. Brief of the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae at 3-5, United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (No. 91-712) (emphasizing the Mexican government's repeated protests and demands for extradition).
68. BROWNLIE, supra note 40, at 87.
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certainly correct that the specific remedy should depend most directly on the specific violation, it is nonetheless important that
international courts and tribunals, and many authors have stressed
the general primacy of the remedy of restitutio in integrum in
international law.69
In the Factory at Chorz6w (Indemnity) case, the Permanent
Court of International Justice declared,
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal
act ... is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all
the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation
which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not
been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible,
payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution
in kind would bear; ... such are the principles which should
serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act
contrary to international law."
In subsequent cases, moreover, other tribunals have followed the
lead of the Permanent Court of International Justice in ordering
restitution when it appeared to be the most appropriate remedy of
the circumstances. In the Temple case, for example, the International Court of Justice held that "Thailand is under an obligation
to restore to Cambodia any objects .. which may .. have been
removed from the Temple or the Temple area by the Thai authorities."'" In the Hostages case,' the same court ordered the release of the United States diplomatic staff and other United States
nationals held by Iran and also ordered the return of all "property, archives and documents of the United States Embassy in Tehran and of its Consulates in Iran."'73 Further support for the primacy of this remedy can be found in the Texaco74 case. There,

69. Support for this position is not universal however. Christine Gray, for example,
writes that "[t]he few cases in which arbitration tribunals have awarded restitutio in integrum seem a weak foundation on which to build the primacy of restitutio in integrum in
international law." CHRISTINE D. GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16
(1987).
70. Factory at Chorz6w (Germany v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, 1, 47 (Sept.
13).
71. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 37 (June 15).
72. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
73. Id. at 45. But see GRAY, supra note 69, at 96 (stating that the Hostages case
does not settle the issue of the primacy of restitution in kind in international law).
74. Texaco v. Libyan Arab Republic (U.S. v. Libya), 53 I.L.R 389 (1979) (Dupuy,
Arb.).
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the arbitrator, Ren6-Jean Dupuy, stated that the "highest doctrinal
authorities favor restitutio in integrum and make it the basis of
reparation, thus giving to it primacy among the various forms of
'
reparation."75
In addition to the judgments of tribunals, many writers also
support the primacy of restitutio in integrum. Hersch Lauterpacht,
for example, wrote that "the rule [is] that in international law...
restitutio in integrum is regarded as the object of redress."'76 Others who share this view (and are quoted at length in the Texaco
case) include Professor Georg Schwarzenberger, 7 Eduardo Jim6nez de Ar6chaga,78 Professor Georges Tenekides,79 Professor
Paul Guggenheim,' and Charles de Visscher 8 F.A. Mann wrote
that "it seems fairly clear that ...

public international law has for

long recognized restitution in kind as a right, probably as the
principal right, against the wrongdoing State."'
Although restitutio in integrum is arguably the primary international law remedy, the specific circumstances of some types of
international law violations preclude the possibility of applying this
remedy. First, the passage of time often makes restitution in kind
difficult, if not impossible. For example, in cases in which an alien
has been unjustly deprived of property, often that property has
been destroyed.' Second, restitution may not constitute an adequate remedy for all the damage suffered, especially for the moral
injury suffered by the state. Third, there may be domestic legal
impediments to restitution. 4 While these considerations may at
75.

Id. at 501-02.

76. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 149 (1927).

77.

Texaco, 53 I.L.R. at 502 (quoting 1 GEORO SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATION-

AL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 233 (1945)).
78. Id. (quoting EDUARDO JIMtNEZ DE ARICHAGA, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNA-

TIONAL LAW 531, 564-67 (M. Sorenson ed., 1968)).
79. Id. at 503-04 (quoting Georges Tenekides, Responsabilit6 Internationale, in 2
ENCYCLOPtDIE JURIDIQUE DALLOZ 790 (1969)).
80. Id. at 504 (quoting 2 PAUL GUGGENHEIM, TRAITP_ DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 68-69 (1954)).
81. Id. at 503 (quoting Charles de Visscher, Le Ddni de Justice en Droit International, 52 R.C.A.D.I. 362, 436-37 (1935)).
82. F.A. Mann, The Consequences of an International Wrong in International and
National Law, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1976-1977).
83.

2 F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 583

(1984).
84. See id.; L.C. GREEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE § 319
(2d ed. 1988) ("Actual restoration of the status quo ante is frequently impossible and the
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times seriously inhibit the use of restitutio in integrum, they are
arguably inapposite in the context of international abduction. As
long as the individual is still alive, restitution is not only possible
but also the most appropriate remedy to eradicate the consequences of the wrong. Moreover, to the extent that there is a moral
injury to the state that is not compensated by the return of the
individual, some other act of reparation in addition to returning
the individual may be appropriate, but this is not a reason not to
return the individual.
In conclusion, even if it is debatable whether restitutio in
integrum is the primary remedy in international law, it is certainly
clear that it is one accepted remedy, and arguably "first among
equals."' Moreover, returning to Browilie's observation that obligations and remedies are inextricably linked, there is considerable
state practice to support the conclusion that restitutio in integrum
is the customary international law remedy in the specific context
of state-sponsored international abduction. 6
B. Customary InternationalLaw
Customary international law exists when "a clear and continuous habit of doing certain actions has grown up under the aegis of
the conviction that these actions are, according to International
Law, obligatory or right."'87 There are thus two components to
customary international law: a habit or practice of doing some act
and a conviction that such act is legally required of the state. This
latter aspect of international custom is referred to as opinio juris.' Evidence of state practice may come from many sources,

most common basis for measuring reparation is monetary."(footnote omitted)).
85. Brownlie, for example, writes that "[t]he conclusion justified by the evidence is
that whilst it is safe to assume that specific restitution as a form of redress has a significant place in the law, it is difficult to state the conditions of its application with any
certainty." BROWNLIE, supra note 40, at 222.
86. See infra Part I1.
87. OPPENHEIM, supra note 36, at 26. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 31, at
4-11 (discussing the elements of international custom). According to the Restatement,
"Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 102(2) (1987).

88. As explained in the Restatement, "[F]or a practice of states to become a rule of
customary international law it must appear that the states follow the practice from a
sense of legal obligation." 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 cmt.

c (1987).
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including "diplomatic acts and instructions as well as public measures and other governmental acts and official statements of policy,
whether they are unilateral or undertaken in cooperation with
other states."'89 Judicial opinions of national or municipal tribunals
also may be considered evidence of state practice. "The practice of
states ... embraces not only their external conduct with each
other, but is also evidenced by such internal matters as their domestic legislation, judicial decisions, diplomatic despatches, internal
government memoranda and ministerial statements in Parliaments
and elsewhere."'
As will be shown, the history of state practice in cases of
state-sponsored international abduction indicates that states have
nearly always demanded the return of an individual improperly
taken from their territory. 9 Moreover, asylum states have generally expressed their demands for return as obligations of the abducting state. Finally, in most cases, though certainly not all, the
abducting state has complied with the asylum state's demand. This
consistent pattern therefore supports a conclusion that an international custom has developed in cases of state-sponsored international abduction: when an asylum state protests an abduction and
demands the return of an individual taken from its territory, the
abducting state is under an international legal duty to return the
individual to the asylum state.
This consistent pattern of return notwithstanding, there have
been incidents when the asylum state's demand for repatriation
was not honored even though the facts clearly showed that the
abducting state had violated international law. The most blatant
example of this was the Alvarez-Machain case, the facts of which
began this Note.' Such examples, however, do not indicate that
89.

1 id. cmt. b.

1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); see also 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §
103; BROWNLIE, supra note 31, at 5 (noting that evidence of international custom includes "diplomatic correspondence ....
opinions of official legal advisors ....
and national judicial decisions . . . ").
91. See infra Part III.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4. Another incident occurred in 1935 when
a German national was attacked on a frontier platform in Czechoslovakia and dragged
across the border into Germany. Although Czechoslovakia immediately demanded his return, it does not appear that Germany complied with the request. Preuss, supra note 21,
at 504. A third example involved the abduction of several Korean students from Germany. See infra note 162. Although Germany demanded that they be returned, apparently
South Korea did not comply with the demand. Thomas H. Sponsler, International Kid90.
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there is no customary law requiring return in cases of international
abduction. International custom does not require that state practice
be unanimous in order to acquire the force of law; some exceptions are allowed provided they are regarded as breaches of the
general rule. The International Court of Justice has written,
In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court
deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general,
be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct
inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated
as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of
a new rule.93
Certainly the outrage engendered by the abduction of Dr. AlvarezMachain by the United States shows that the "no abduction" rule
is well established and that the failure to return the individual by
the United States was not accepted as a harbinger of an emerging
rule permitting such action.' Canada took the highly unusual step
of filing an amicus curiae brief arguing in favor of repatriation in
the Alvarez-Machain case. Further, the members of the Organization of American States requested a legal opinion from the InterAmerican Juridical Committee on the legal aspects of Dr. AlvarezMachain's abduction. The significant number of cases that have
resulted in return suggests that in the instances in which the individual has not been returned, the abducting state has thereby committed a further violation of international law. As Mann writes,
"[T]he failure to comply with a request for the return of the abducted person is a separate wrong which is quite independent of
the original one."95

napping, 5 INT'L LAWv. 27, 42-43 (1971).
93. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 98 (June 27).
94. For example, in 1992, several Latin American countries and two European states
favored requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the
very issue raised by United States actions in the Alvarez-Machain case. Angulo &
Reardon, supra note 4, at 284. Further, "[a]s a State Department spokesperson acknowledged following the decision, 'Many governments have expressed outrage that the United
States believes it has the right to decide unilaterally to enter their territory and abduct
one of their nationals.'" David 0. Stewart, The Price of Vengeance, A.B.A. J., Nov.
1992, at 50.
95. Mann, supra note 23, at 411.
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III.

RESTITUTIO IN INTEGRUM IN CASES
OF STATE-SPONSORED ABDUCTION

A. Restitutio in Integrum and State Practice
Although neither are authoritative sources of international
custom, both the Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with
Respect to Crime and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
support the position that the return of the individua.l is the appropriate remedy in cases of state-sponsored international abduction.
The commentary to article 16 of the Harvard Convention states,
It is everywhere agreed, of course, that "recourse to measures in
violation of international law or international convention" in
obtaining custody of a person charged with crime entails an international responsibility which must be discharged by the release
or restoration of the person taken, indemnification of the injured
State, or otherwise. 6
Similarly, the Restatement states that in cases of international abduction, "the state from which the person was abducted may demand return of the person, and international law requires that he
be returned."97 The cases discussed below support the legal conclusion of both the Restatement and the Harvard Convention.
When a person has been abducted from, or arrested in, the territory of another state by officials or agents of the abducting state,
the asylum state has not consented to the arrest, and the asylum
state has demanded the return of that individual, the abducting
state usually has returned the individual. For the purposes of
showing opinio juris, moreover, the demand for return is as important as the actual return of the individual, as that demand indi96. Draft Convention on Jurisdiction ivith
Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J.INT'L L. 437,
623-24 (1935). The following sentence, however, severely limits the "of course" nature of
the asserted remedy: "It is not everywhere agreed that there may be no prosecution or
punishment in reliance upon custody thus obtained 'without first obtaining the consent of
the State or States whose rights have been violated by such measures.'" Id. at 624. This
distinction suggests that the remedy of return was not at the time of the Harvard Convention nearly as accepted as the commentary at first intimates. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the drafters of the Convention explicitly acknowledged that article
16 was "in part of the nature of legislation." Id. Nonetheless, the drafters opined that
this remedy was desirable due to the "most persuasive considerations of policy." hd. at
623.
97. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 432 cmt. c (1987).
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cates the asylum state's belief that return is the appropriate remedy.
1.

United States. A review of United States practice over

the past 150 years indicates that the executive branch of the U.S.
government has been a consistent proponent of the position that

in cases of abduction or extraterritorial arrest in violation of a
nation's territorial sovereignty, the arresting state is obligated to
return the individual.98 Moreover, evidence of United States
practice reflects opinio juris and refutes the position that this
practice has been merely an issue of comity. Specifically, the
official correspondences of the U.S. government have stressed that
the remedy of return is an international legal right. The following

incidents present only a limited sample of the numerous times in
which the United States has either demanded the return of an
individual abducted from U.S. territory or returned an individual
abducted from another state's territory; other instances abound."
The Nogales case of 1887"® presented an explicit endorse98. In virtually every instance in which the United States has failed to return an abducted individual, there was arguably no breach of international law. See United States v.
Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981) (no demand for return by the Bahamas); United
States v. Lara, 539 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1976) (noting involvement of national police in
arrest); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974) (same);
United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (no demand for return by Uruguay); United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.) (noting involvement of local police in arrest), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973); United States v. Unverzagt, 299 F. 1015,
1017 (W.D. Wash. 1924) (no demand for return by Canada), affd sub nom. Unverzagt v.
Benn, 5 F.2d 492 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 566 (1925); State v. Brewster, 7 Vt.
118 (1835) (same).
99.

See 2 GREEN H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 310-11 (1941).

Hackworth recounts the Cantu incident of 1914. In that case, the former mayor of
Lampasos, Mexico, was seized in the United States and dragged across the border into
Mexico. The United States demanded his immediate release and return. Four days later,
Cantu was released. See also 4 JOHN B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

§ 603 (1906) [hereinafter MOORE'S DIGEST] (noting incident in which the demand by the
United States for the return of Rufino Rueda, who, on June 19, 1891, was abducted
from Key West and taken to Havana by Spanish agents, was complied with); C.V. Cole,
Extradition Treaties Abound, but Unlawfid Seizures Continue, INT'L PERSPECTIVES, Mar.-

Apr. 1975, at 40-41 (reciting a 1908 incident involving Adeland Lefond, who was arrested
in Illinois, taken to Canada, and held in a Winnipeg jail; upon "the request of the U.S.
consul, LeFond was released . . . and he was provided with free transportation back to
Illinois"); id. at 41 (noting a 1909 incident in which a Mr. Marker was arrested in the
United States by two men, one of whom claimed to be a member of the North West
Mounted Police; after a protest by the United States, Marker was released).
100.

1 JOHN B. MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION & INTERSTATE RENDITION
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ment by the United States of the legal obligation to return an abducted individual. In that case, a Mexican lieutenant was arrested
in Arizona for assaulting a constable. In transit to the prison, the
lieutenant was rescued by several Mexican soldiers and escaped
with them to Mexico."0 ' The U.S. government immediately demanded that the Mexican lieutenant be returned to the United
States, and on the next day Mexico agreed to do so. After the
agreement to return the lieutenant, confusion arose because Mexico believed that the United States had offered the choice either to
return the individual to the United States or to punish the lieutenant in Mexico. To clear up this misunderstanding, the United
States stated, in no uncertain terms, that "the armed invasion...
left for Mexico the simple international duty of restoring him to
the place from which he was taken."'"
A similar demand was made by the United States in the case
of Abraham Gonzales. Gonzales was kidnapped from the United
States by a Mexican military officer. The United States immediately wrote to the American legation in Mexico, "You will lose no
time in making a representation upon this subject to the Mexican
government. You will demand the return of Gonzales. ... ""
Another incident arose in 1849, when the United States demanded
the return of a Cuban political refugee who had been kidnapped
from New Orleans under direction of the Spanish consul. The U.S.
consul in Havana was instructed to "demand ...the prompt surrender of the person in question, in order that he might be sent
back to New Orleans." 14
Another incident was the case of Grogan." In 1841, British
soldiers seized this American citizen from his house in Vermont
and took him to to Canada. Acting Secretary of State Webster
wrote the British minister and demanded the release and restoration of Grogan. In response, the British minister immediately ordered the acting governor of Canada to release Grogan, who was

§ 196 (1891) [hereinafter MOORE'S TREATISE].

101.

1 id.

102.

1 id. (emphasis added).

103.

Letter from Mr. W. Hunter to Mr. Thomas H. Nelson (Aug. 1, 1872), in 1 U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 448 (1872).
104. See 4 MOORE'S DIGEST, supra note 99, § 603.
105. 1 MOORE'S TREATISE, supra note 100, § 189.
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then escorted back to Vermont."° In the case of Blair, 17 an
1876 incident, an individual posing as a British member of Parliament kidnapped an American citizen and took him to the United
Kingdom. The United States wrote to the United Kingdom and
requested that "the man be immediately set at liberty and restored
to this country."'" Notwithstanding the fact that Blair had already been convicted in England on a criminal charge, he was
released and returned to the United States."°
In March 1911, two U.S. citizens, Edward M. Blatt and Lawrence F. Converse, were abducted in the United States by Mexican
citizens and conveyed across the Rio Grande into Mexico."'
Once in Mexican territory, they were arrested on a charge of sedition by Mexican soldiers who were awaiting their arrival and who
had been directing the kidnappers. In response, the U.S. government wrote to the Mexican government that these actions constituted a "grave violation of the sovereignty of the United
and that the U.S. government "would be obliged to
States"'
request that they be immediately returned.... 2 Mexico subsequently released the two men.
Incidents in which the United States has acknowledged return
to be the proper international law remedy have also occurred
when the United States was the abducting party. In the case of
Bratton,"3 in 1872, the British government complained to the
United States that Dr. Rufus Bratton had been seized in Canada
and taken to the United States, where he was arrested for violation of the Ku Klux Act. The British government communicated
to the U.S. government that it considered the act to be a violation
of British sovereignty and territorial independence and requested

106.

1 id.

107. 1 id. § 191.
108.

1 id.

109. 1 id.
110. 2 HACKWORTH, supra note 99, at 309.

111. 2 id. (quoting note from acting Secretary of State Wilson to the Mexican Ambassador de ]a Barra (Mar. 14, 1911)).
112. 2 id. It is interesting to note that the U.S. government also argued, in the alternative, that even if the two individuals had been apprehended in Mexican territory, they
had subsequently been transported over United States territory before reentering Mexico.
The U.S. government argued that this violation of American sovereignty alone would be
sufficient to warrant the release of Blatt and Converse. 2 id. at 309-10.
113. 1 MOORE'S TREATISE, supra note 100, § 190.
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the return of Bratton. n 4 The U.S. Secretary of State, Hamilton
Fish, replied,
When the matter of Bratton's abduction was first brought to the
attention of this government ...

prompt and immediate steps

were at once taken to have him returned to the authorities and
jurisdiction of Canada. I trust that I need not assure you that the
government of the United States would lend no sanction to any
act of its officers or its citizens involving a violation of the territorial independence or sovereignty of her Majesty's dominions."'
Another incident arose in 1920, when U.S. officers arrested a U.S.
citizen, Vincenti, while in British territorial waters." 6 Soon thereafter, the Department of State informed the ambassador of the
United Kingdom that Vincenti's bail had been dismissed and that
all proceedings subsequent to his "unlawful arrest" had been
dropped." 7 A final incident is the case of Ronald J. Anderson,
who, on August 24, 1974, was crossing into the United States from
Canada." 8 When Anderson was recognized by the customs officer
as an army deserter, he fled back over to the Canadian side of the
border. United States officials pursued Anderson into Canada, arrested him there, and removed him to the United States. The
Canadian government protested the arrest and Anderson was
returned to Canada." 9
In addition to United States diplomatic practice, U.S. court
decisions also have acknowledged that the return of the individual
is the proper remedy for international abductions, even if they
have not recognized any power of their own to effectuate the return. 20 For example, in United States v. Insull,' a case in
which the defendant was forcibly removed from a Greek ship by
Turkish police officers, the district court held that "[the Hellenic
Republic or Turkey, through their sovereignties, if unlawfully in-

114.

1 id.

115. 1 id. (quoting Letter from Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Sir E. Thornton (Nov.
12, 1872)).
116. 1 GREEN H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 624 (1940).
117. 1 id.
118. Cole, supra note 99, at 42.
119. Id.
120. See infra Part IV.
121. 8 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. 11. 1934).
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vaded, may demand reparation and a surrender of the abducted
party ....
As one might infer from the above discussion of
U.S. practice, Canadian practice also has supported the development of the customary international law norm. In the Lefond
case' and124the Marker case,
the Can
Canadian government returned individuals who had been abducted from, or arrested in,
the territory of the United States, and in the Anderson case,"z
the Canadian government demanded the return of an individual
who had been improperly taken from its territory.
Two further incidents also reflect the Canadian government's
position on the issue. The first occurred in 1863, when two Canadian constables abducted two individuals from the United States.
When the United States protested the arrest in its territory, the
''governor general of Canada ... offered at once to restore the
abducted persons, if the United States should require it. ' In a
letter sent to the British government, Lord Monck, governor of
Canada, wrote that "[i]nasmuch, however, as [the abductees] were
made amenable [to Canadian judicial power] by an act clearly
illegal on the part of the Canadian constables, I am prepared to
restore them ...

to the custody from which they were re-

moved ...."" The second incident occurred in 1960. In that
case, two American Indians, Edward and Howard Kohosed, were
removed from a workboat on the St. Clair river by Michigan police. The Canadian government argued that the arrest took place
in Canadian waters and that "in light of the circumstances of the
arrest, the two men 1should
have been released and immediately
28
returned to Canada."'

122.
at 313; see also United States v. Unverzagt, 299 F. 1015, 1016-17 (W.D.
Wash. 1924) (noting that in the case of a person abducted from British Columbia, either
England or Canada could demand return, but that this was a political matter between
sovereigns),

Unverzagt v. Benn, 5 F.2d 492 (9th Cir.),

269

U.S. 566 (1925). Cf.United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 278 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting
that abductions that violate a nation's sovereignty are generally redressed by returning
the individual).
123.
124.

125.
126.
127.
128.

note 99.

text accompanying notes 118-19.
4 MOORE'S DIGEST,
note 99, § 603.
Letter from Lord Monck to Lord Lyons (May 22, 1863),
Cole,
note 99, at 41.

note 36, at 622.
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The most explicit evidence of the Canadian position on international abduction, however, is set forth in its amicus curiae brief
to the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of United States v. AlvarezMachain.2 9 In its brief, the Canadian government stated that
Canada and its component governments do not hold to a policy
of abductions from American territory, and if abductions occur,
they could not reasonably expect the United States to acquiesce
in Canadian courts' disrespect of U.S. sovereignty through exercise of jurisdiction over abducted individuals. The Government of
Canada would, upon protest, cooperate to obtain the return of
an abducted fugitive."3
The brief continued that in Canada's view, the "customs and usages of civilized nations ...

suggest that official abductions are un-

lawful and require restitution of the status quo ante.'' The fact
that Canada also argued that state-sponsored abductions would
violate the extradition treaty in force between the United States
and Canada" could lessen the persuasive force of the quoted
statements. However, the Canadian argument seemed to be based
on the theory that such abductions would violate both Canadian
sovereignty generally and the extradition treaty specifically; indeed, in its brief the Canadian government explicitly relied on a
survey of foreign governments to support its position that statesponsored abduction violates international law and requires the
return of the individual. Many of the responding governments,
moreover, maintained that an abduction would constitute a violation of their sovereignty regardless of any collateral violation of a
bilateral extradition treaty." Because Canada supported its position by relying on the statements of nations that would protest
and demand return even without the existence of an extradition
treaty with the abducting state, it is difficult to argue that
Canada's position rested exclusively on the breach of the extradition treaty.
M

129.

112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).

130. Canadian Brief, supra note 65, at 3.
131. Id. at 4.
132. Id.
133. Id. ("Canada sets forth a survey of some of the incidents and expressions of
policy which show the understanding in international law that abducted persons must be
returned to a nation when it protests the infringement of its sovereignty." (emphasis added)).
134. See infra text accompanying notes 170-73.
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3. Mexico. With one exception,"a5 Mexico's conduct in
international abduction cases also has contributed to the
development of the international custom requiring return. Mexican
demands for the return of individuals have met with only limited
success: in the Martinez incident,'36 Ex parte Lopez," 7 and the
Alvarez-Machain case, the Mexican government's demands did not
result in return of the abducted individuals. 3 ' Nonetheless, the
constant demands for return are testament to the Mexican
government's position that repatriation is the appropriate remedy
for an unlawful abduction. Moreover, Mexico's position in the
Nogales'39 incident was particularly clear in this respect. In that
case, in response to the demand by the United States for the
return of the lieutenant, the Mexican minister of foreign affairs
"admitted the right of the United States to demand the restoration
of the status quo."" In addition, like Canada and the United
States, Mexico has
repatriated persons abducted in violation of
141
international law.
4. The United Kingdom. British practice also lends support
to the conclusion that customary international law requires the

135. In an 1881 incident, although Mexico protested an abduction from Mexico by a
U.S. sheriff and demanded that the abductor be punished, Mexico did not demand return
of the individual. Letter from Sefior de Zamacona to Mr. James G. Blaine (Aug. 8,
1881), in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 837-38

(1881). Although there was one other incident in which Mexico did not demand return,
that failure can be explained by the fact that the incident generated such outrage that
the U.S. judge set the abductee free the day after he was sentenced and therefore Mexico had no reason to demand his return. Letter from Sefior M. Romero to Mr. W.Q.
Gresham (Sept. 6, 1893), in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES 457 (1893).
136. See infra note 138.
137. 6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Tex. 1934).
138. The failure to return the individual is justified in two of these cases since no
violation of international law appears to have occurred. In the Martinez incident, the
abduction was apparently committed by private individuals and thus there was no state
act that could give rise to responsibility. See Letter from the Acting Secretary of State to
the Mexican Charg6 (June 22, 1906), in 2 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 40, at
1121-22. In Ex parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. at 344, although two of the abductors were U.S.
agents, another was a captain in the Mexican army. This involvement constituted consent
and destroyed any claim of state responsibility.
139. See text accompanying notes 100-102.
140. 1 MOORE'S TREATISE, supra note 100, § 196 (emphasis added).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 110-12.
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return of an abducted individual. In the Grogan case, 142 the
British minister ordered the acting governor of Canada to restore
a person taken from the United States, and in the Bratton
case,143 the United Kingdom demanded the return of an abducted
individual. An 1861 correspondence from the United Kingdom to
the United States involving the arrest by the American Navy of
four British subjects from the merchant vessel Trent is instructive:
[l]t thus appears that certain individuals have been forcibly taken
from on board a British vessel, . . . an act of violence which
was ... a violation of international law .... Her Majesty's
Government trust that... The Government of the United
States ... will ... offer to the British Government such redress
as alone could satisfy the British nation, namely, the liberation of
the 4 prisoners taken from the Trent, and their delivery to your
Lordship .... "
This position was reiterated in 1863, when the British government wrote to the United States with respect to an incident involving Ebenezor Tyler, who was taken from his house in the
township of Wolf Island, Canada, by U.S. soldiers.4 ' In response
to the incident, Lord Lyons wrote to William Seward, the U.S.
Secretary of State, "I do not doubt that, if the statements made in
the enclosed documents be not disproved, the government of the
United States will at once set Tyler at liberty, and offer to her
Majesty's government due satisfaction for the violation of her
Majesty's territory."'" The United States replied that assuming
the facts to be as stated, "you correctly appreciate the sense of
justice of this government by expecting that Tyler will be set at
liberty, and that other147proper reparation will be made to her
Majesty's government.'
Most explicitly, the Law Officers specifically endorsed this
remedy in the Lawler case of 1860. In that case, Lawler, a convict,
had escaped from Gibraltar and fled into Spanish territory, where

142. See supra text accompanying note 105.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 113-15.
144. Letter from Mr. William H. Seward to Lord Lyons (Dec. 26, 1861), in 55 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 627, 627-28 (1864-1865) (emphasis added).
145. Letter from Lord Lyons to Mr. William H. Seward (Mar. 19, 1863), in 1 U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 36, at 524.
146. Id.
147. Letter from Mr. William H. Seward to Lord Lyons (Mar. 20, 1863), in 1 U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 36, at 525.
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he was apprehended by a British prison officer.14 The Law Officers wrote that "[a] plain breach of international law having occurred, we deem it to be the duty of the State, into whose territory the individual ...

was conveyed, to restore the aggrieved State,

upon its request to that effect, as far as possible, to its original position.' 49 They thus advised "that notice be given to the Spanish
authorities that, at a given time and place ...

Lawler will be set

at liberty."' 50
5. European States. Evidence of the customary international
law requiring the return of the abducted individual is also found in
the practice of several other European states during the last 125
years.
In 1873, Lorenzo Caratacciolo, an Italian refugee residing in
Corfu, was induced to board an Italian steamer in port in
Corfu.' Once on board, Caratacciolo was put in irons by Italian
officers, and the steamer soon left port. When the Greek government demanded that Italy restore Caratacciolo to Corfu, Italy refused. In a conversation with a member of the United States legation in Athens, Mr. Delegeorges, the Greek minister, stated in
exasperation that "[this transaction only proves that small powers
have no rights."'52 In a subsequent letter from the United States
legation, the U.S. ambassador further developed the Greek position. He stated,
I am informed that the Greek prime minister, Mr. Delegeorges,
has demanded of the Italian government the restoration of the
deported refugee to his home at Corfu, and that proper reparation be made by it "for," to quote the language of the Nomarch
[sic] of Corfu, "the insult offered to the sovereign rights of
Greece.""

148. O'Higgins, supra note 20, at 295.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Id. Further evidence of United Kingdom practice is found in one 1892 incident in

which the British government agreed to return to New York a boy who had been abducted from that state. 4 MOORE'S DIGEST, supra note 99, § 603.

151.

Letter from Mr. John M. Francis to Mr. Hamilton Fish (Feb. 10, 1873), in 1 U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 432, 432-33 (1873).

152. 1 id. (emphasis added). The language of the minister indicates that the Greek
government believed return was a matter of right, not of comity. In other words, the
Greek government evidently believed that its rights were not being respected by Italy's
refusal to release Caratacciolo after Greece had demanded his return.
153. Letter from Mr. John M. Francis to Mr. Hamilton Fish (Feb. 13, 1873), in 1 U.S.
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The Italian court's handling of this incident also deserves to be
highlighted, as its actions are further evidence of the international
custom requiring repatriation. The U.S. ambassador reported that
"the Court of appeals at Trani, in [Italy], promptly decided that
the arrest of Caratacciolo was in violation of international law, and
granted him liberty on the condition that he should leave Italy
within five days."' 5
In 1933, Jacob Solomon, a German political 6migr6 living in
Switzerland, was induced to enter into a car that was then driven
through the Swiss customs post and into German territory. 155
Once in Germany, officials awaiting his arrival arrested him. The
Swiss government protested this "grave violation of [its] sovereignty" and demanded his immediate return.' 56 Although the German
government initially refused to surrender Solomon,"7 it soon "admitted error and returned Jacob[] to Swiss authorities."' 58
The case In re Jolis5 9 is also reflective of this general pattern. On July 9, 1933, Pierre Jolis, a Belgian national, visited a
caf6 in France. After Jolis left the caf6 and returned to Belgium,
the proprietor of the caf6 noticed that some money was missing.
The proprietor and two French gardes-champ~tres proceeded to
enter Belgian territory, arrest Jolis, and return him to France. The
Belgian government lodged an official protest with the French
government and demanded the return of Jolis. When the case
came before the French court, it held that "[tihe arrest, effected
by French officers on foreign territory, could have no legal effect
whatsoever, and was completely null and void."' 6 The court pro6
ceeded to order that Jolis be released. 1
Although the following cases are not explicit endorsements of
the requirements of international law, the actions of the parties,
including the demand for return, constitute some evidence of the
DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 151, at 435 (emphasis added).
154. Letter from Mr. John M. Francis to Mr. Hamilton Fish (Mar. 1, 1873), in 1 U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 151, at 437.
155. Preuss, supra note 21, at 503.

156. Id.
157. The German government claimed that the abduction was not committed by government officials and thus that there had been no international wrong committed by the
German government. Id.
158. BASSIOUNI, supra note 13, at 235.
159. 7 Ann. Dig. 191 (Trib. Correctionel d'Avesnes 1933) (Fr.).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 192.
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international custom.162 In 1885, agents of Baden, Germany, apprehended a fugitive in Swiss territory. In response to the request
of the Swiss government, the German authorities ordered his release."6 The Italian government took similar action the following
year after Italian agents arrested an Italian national in Swiss territory."6 In another case, Mr. Gutzeut, a German national, was abducted from Dutch territory and taken to Germany. The Dutch
government demanded his return, and soon thereafter German
authorities conducted Gutzeut to the border." In a more recent
case, the Dutch government demanded the "immediate return" of
a criminal defendant who had been lured to Germany by undercover agents. The highest German court with jurisdiction in criminal and civil cases recognized that the Dutch government had a
right to "restitution," which may have to take the form of the
physical return of the individual."
Finally, many countries that have not been included in this
review of specific instances of abduction have nonetheless expressed their views on the consequences of an international abduction. In response to the kidnapping of Sidney Jaffe from Canada by two United States bounty hunters in 1981,67 Canada requested from foreign governments their opinions as to the propriety of international abductions." A similar survey was conducted
in 1992, in reaction to the abduction of Alvarez-Machain. 6 9 In its
70 case, the Canadian
amicus curiae brief in the Alvarez-Machain"
government related the views of the survey respondents. Australia,
Austria, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Nor-

162. In addition to the cases recounted here, see Mann, supra note 23, at 411, 411
n.20. An interesting, though somewhat inconclusive, incident occurred in 1967. From June
16 to June 20 of that year, a total of 24 South Korean students were removed from
various countries (fourteen were taken from Germany, eight from France, one from the
United States, and one from Australia). Sponsler, supra note 92, at 42. Once in South
Korea, the students were charged with involvement in a large scale communist espionage
network. Id. at 42-43. Two of the aggrieved states, Germany and France, demanded the
return of the students. Id. South Korea apologized to France and stated that the students
would be permitted to return to France. Id.

163.

Preuss, supra note 21, at 506.

164.

Id.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 505 n.13.
Judgment of Dec. 19, 1986, BGH, 1987 NJW 3087.
See Lewis, supra note 20, at 345.
Canadian Brief, supra note 65, at 5.
Id.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
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way, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland all "indicated that
they would regard such an abduction as a violation of their sovereignty and would protest."17' Finland, Germany, Great Britain,
and the Netherlands stated that they would demand the return of
the abducted person. In addition, Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland said that if an abducted
person were brought to their territory, they "would consider that
person should be returned"'73 to the asylum state.

the ...

B. Conclusions on State Practice
In addition to the conclusion that state practice supports the
return of an abducted individual when the asylum state protests
the abduction, two other conclusions can be drawn from this review of state practice. The first is that the nationality of the abducted person is irrelevant as to both the nature of the violation
and the duty of the abducting state to return the individual. State
practice strongly suggests that states perceive the underlying wrong
to be the violation of territorial sovereignty; states have protested
and demanded return regardless of the nationality of the abducted
individual. For example, the United States protested the abduction
of Cantu and Nogales, both Mexican nationals; 74 Canada protested the arrest of Anderson, a United States national; 75 Switzerland protested the abduction of Jacob Solomon, a German
6migre; 7 Greece protested the abduction of Caratacciolo, an
Italian refugee; and Germany and France both protested the
abduction of South Korean students.78
A more tentative conclusion is that the purpose of the abduction also is irrelevant. Although only two cases are on point, in
both cases when a person has been "retaken" from the asylum
state, the asylum state has nonetheless protested. Thus, in the An-

171. Canadian Brief, supra note 65, at 5.
172. Id. Of these countries, only Great Britain stated that it would consider the abduction to constitute, in addition, a violation of a bilateral extradition treaty. Id. Thus,
most countries considered return to be the appropriate remedy for the violation of their
sovereignty, regardless of any collateral violation of a bilateral extradition treaty.
173.

Id.

174.
175.
176.
177.

See
See
See
See

178.

See supra note 162.

supra note
supra text
supra text
supra text

99, text accompanying notes 100-02.
accompanying notes 118-19.
accompanying notes 155-58.
accompanying notes 151-54.
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derson case, Canada demanded that the United States restore the
individual even though he had only moments before fled from the
United States into Canada." 9 Similarly, in the Lawler case, the
Law Officers did not consider it important that the individual had
escaped from British territory."s This position, moreover, is logically consistent with the view that the underlying wrong is the
violation of the territorial sovereignty of the asylum state; the purpose of the abduction does not, and should not, affect the nature
of the wrong.
IV.

PROBLEMS OF EFFECrUATING RETURN:
THE UNITED STATES

The preceding discussion indicates that the customary international law remedy is well established in cases of state-sponsored
international abduction. Nonetheless, the issue remains in the United States and other countries' as to whether domestic courts
have the power to effectuate this international law remedy.
As a general matter, international law is part of United States
law, though the extent to which it is relied on by domestic courts
and the extent to which domestic courts are empowered to effectuate it is subject to much debate.Y The Constitution states that
treaties "shall be the supreme Law of the Land,"1" and although
customary international law is not similarly mentioned in the Constitution, some have argued that it should be equally enforceable." The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations asserts that
international law is part of United States law and states that
"[i]nternational law and international agreements of the United
States are law of the United States and supreme over the law of
the several States.' 85

179. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 148-50.
181. For example, it appears that the German Constitutional Court does not consider
ordering the return of an abducted person to be within its power. See Mann, supra note
23, at 421 n.72.
182. See Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal,
100 YALE LJ. 2277, 2283-91 (1991).
183. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
184. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MicH. L. REV.
1555, 1564-67 (1984).
185. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 111(1) (1987).
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Notwithstanding this general rule, United States courts hearing
international abduction cases have held that it is beyond their
power to order the return of an individual seized in violation of
international law. They have held that if an individual is to be
repatriated, such repatriation must be effectuated by the executive
branch."s Arguably, however, United States courts have misconstrued their own power in reaching this conclusion.
The question of the proper remedy in cases of international
abduction first arose in a United States court in State v.
Brewster." In that case, "citizens"'" of Vermont apprehended
the defendant from Canada and returned him to the state to stand
trial on a charge of burglary.'89 The Supreme Court of Vermont

held that "[t]he illegality, if any, consists in a violation of the sovereignty of an independent nation. If that nation complain, it is a
matter which concerns the political relations of the two countries,
and in that aspect, is a subject not within the constitutional powers
of this court."'" When presented with similar instances of international abduction, federal courts also generally have adopted a
limited view of their power. In United States v. Unverzagt,' for
example, the district court held that "[a]ny infractions are subject
to international negotiation, so far as the party chooses to seek redress. It must be obvious that with this the courts have nothing to
do."'" Similarly, in United States v. Insull," the district court
held that "the mere fact.., that [the defendant] was kidnapped
from the Hellenic authorities, would not give this court power to
186. See, e.g., United States v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp. 515, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ("The
question of violation of international law . . . is to be left to the proper consideration of
the political and executive branches of the government should the offended state choose
to raise the issue."), affd, 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957); Unit-

ed States v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Ill. 1934); United States v. Unverzagt, 299 F.
1015 (W.D. Wash. 1924), affd sub nom. Unverzagt v. Benn, 5 F.2d 492 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 269 U.S. 566 (1925); State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118, 122-23 (1835); cf. United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 n.16 (1992) (noting the "advantage of the
diplomatic approach").
187. 7 Vt. 118 (1835).
188. The facts do not indicate whether these persons were officials of the state of
Vermont or private persons. Id. at 118. The court, however, seemed to consider this distinction irrelevant to the disposition of the case. Id. at 121.
189. Id. at 118.
190. Id. at 121-22.
191.

299 F. 1015 (W.D. Wash. 1924), affd sub nom. Unverzagt v. Benn, 5 F.2d 492

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 566 (1925).
192. Id. at 1016.
193.

8 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Ill. 1934).

1994]

INTERNATIONAL ABDUCTION

examine such fact, and, if true, release the defendant. The court
has no such power. ' , 194 Finally, in Fiocconi v. Attorney General of

the United States,19 the district court held that "[c]ourts are without power to remedy breaches of commitments
among nations
1

which are not the subject of treaty obligations. %

This limited view of judicial power, however, is inconsistent
with the duty of United States courts to apply international law. In
Paquete Habana,97 the Supreme Court held that
[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there
is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages
of civilized nations."a

Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations states that
"[c]ourts in the United States are bound to give effect to international law and international agreements . . . .""' As explained by
the commentary, "The proposition that international law ... [is]

law in the United States is addressed mainly to the courts."2"
Paquete Habana thus provides United States courts with an explicit mandate to enforce customary international law in those cases in
which to do so would not violate any domestic law or international agreement." 1 In light of this command, domestic courts should

194. Id. at 313; see also United States v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp. 515, 523 (S.D.N.Y.
1956) (noting that a violation of international law is a matter between sovereigns), affd,
244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957).
195. 339 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1059 (1972).
196. Id. at 1247.
197. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
198. Id. at 700 (emphasis added). Although The Paquete Habana is the most explicit
endorsement of the power and duty of United States courts to apply international law,
other Supreme Court cases also have recognized the obligation of domestic courts to enforce international law within the United States. In The Nereide, Bennett, Master, 13
U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815), the Court held that United States courts are "bound by
the law of nations which is a part of the law of the land." In addition, the Court held,
in United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820), that the "law of nations . . .may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on
public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations ......
199. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 131(3) (1987).

200. 1 id. § 131 cmt. c.
201. See Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104
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reconsider their jurisprudence with respect to their power in cases
of state-sponsored international abduction. Since customary international law requires the return of an abducted individual, federal
courts should attempt to "administer" this customary international
law remedy to the best of their ability. 2
By its own terms, the rule of Paquete Habana allows customary international law to be superseded by contrary judicial decision, treaties, acts of Congress, and acts of the executive. However, two factors suggest that the threshold for determining that a
judicial decision, treaty, or executive or legislative act is contrary
should be fairly high. First, in Paquete Habana itself, the Court
refused to infer a contrary domestic rule of law that was not clearly stated: the Court would not infer from treaty silence that coast
fishing vessels were not protected from seizure in time of war. 3

LJ. 39, 40 (1994) ("Although commentators continue to debate the extent of executive,
legislative or judicial power to trump customary international law, the import of The
Paquete Habana is clear Customary international law informs the construction of domestic law, and, at least in the absence of any superceding positive law, is controlling.").
202. It is also encouraging that in the case of Dr. Alvarez-Machain, the federal district court thought that it had the power to order Dr. Alvarez-Machain's return. Once
the district court had determined that the United States had violated the extradition
treaty between the United States and Mexico, it held that international law required that
the remedy for the breach "wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act." United
States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp 599, 614 (C.D. Cal. 1990), affd sub nom. United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
Consequently, the court held that "[t]he remedy in the present case is the immediate
return of Dr. Machain to the territory of Mexico. Accordingly, the United States is
hereby ordered to return him to the territory of Mexico." Id. If United States courts are
equally empowered to remedy breaches of international agreements and customary international law, cf. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (holding that United States courts are
to administer "international law" and drawing no distinction between conventional and
customary international law), then domestic courts possess the authority to order the
return of an abducted individual to an asylum state even in the absence of any breach of
an international agreement, solely on the basis of a breach of customary international
law. But see Brief for the United States at 29, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.
Ct 2188 (1992) (No. 91-712), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File (arguing
that "[n]o provision of law grants to the courts the extraordinary power to repatriate a
person").
203. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 711.
The decision that enemy property on land, which by the modem usage of nations is not subject to capture as prize of war, cannot be condemned by a prize
court, even by direction of the executive, without express authority from Congress, appears to us to repel any inference that coast fishing vessels, which are
exempt by the general consent of civilized nations from capture, and which no
act of Congress or order of the President has expressly authorized to be taken
and confiscated, must be condemned by a prize court, for want of a distinct exemption in a treaty or other public act of the Government.
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In other words, any override of customary international law by a
domestic law must be reasonably explicit.
Moreover, not every act by any executive branch official can
be considered a controlling executive act that overrides international law. While there is certainly dispute as to whether the President may order a violation of international law,' this power
probably does not exist for lower level officials. Noting that in
Paquete Habana, the act of an admiral did not override international law, the Eleventh Circuit held in Garcia-Mir v. Meese that
"[a]t best, [Paquete Habana] suggests that lower level officials
cannot by their acts render international law inapplicable." 5
The second reason that the threshold for finding a domestic
law to be contrary should be fairly high is derived from the Supreme Court case of The Schooner Charming Betsy, in which the
Court noted that "[ilt has also been observed that an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains .

. . ."'

This principle,

recognizing as it does the important role of international law, has
been construed to cover common law doctrines as well. 2 7 In
Gisbert v. Attorney General, the Fifth Circuit held that "[p]ublic
international law has been incorporated into the common law of
the United States ... and we are thus bound to construe the

federal common law, to the extent reasonably possible, to avoid
violating principles of public international law. '"''2
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine, moreover, should not be considered
a contrary "judicial decision" within the meaning of Paquete Habana and should not preclude domestic courts from ordering the
return of an abducted person. The doctrine does not explicitly

204. Compare Jonathan I. Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United
States Government to Violate Customary International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913, 921

(1986) ("The President's special role in the United States Government ...suggests that
the President, acting alone, may have the authority under domestic law to place the
United States in violation of customary international law.") with Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 930, 936 (1986) ("The President cannot

disregard international law ... any more than he can disregard any other law.").
205. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889
(1986).
206.
207.

Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
Schwabach & Patchett, supra note 26, at 55.

208. Gisbert v. Attorney General, 988 F.2d 1437, 1447 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1453 (holding that "courts must construe American law so as to

avoid violating principles of public international law").
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contradict the international law rule, and its scope can be construed consistently with international law. In 1886, in Ker v. Illinois,2°9 the U.S. Supreme Court first considered the issue of international abduction. The defendant was wanted in Illinois on
larceny charges. After he fled to Peru, a messenger was sent to
retrieve him in accordance with the extradition treaty then in force
between the United States and Peru. Instead, the messenger kidnapped Ker and forcibly returned him to the United States."'
The Court held that the abduction did not divest the district court
of jurisdiction over the defendant."' In Frisbie v. Collins,"' the
Court extended the Ker holding to cases of interstate kidnapping.
Taken together, the two cases have been said to "[recognize] jurisdiction over a defendant213 before the court regardless of how his
presence was obtained.
United States courts that have considered the issue of international abduction have repeatedly relied on the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
to justify exercising jurisdiction over defendants. 214 However,
while the exercise of jurisdiction is perfectly legitimate under KerFrisbie, nothing in the doctrine compels this result. Ker-Frisbie is
merely a permissive doctrine; it allows, but does not require,
courts to exercise jurisdiction notwithstanding irregularities or
illegalities that have occurred during a defendant's arrest. Indeed,
in Ker the Court held that

209. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
210. Id. at 438.
211. Id. at 444.
212.
213.

342 U.S. 519 (1952).
Abramovsky, supra note 9, at 158.

214. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859, 860 (5th Cir. 1974).
In fact, however, as shown before, every reported case of international abduction in
which the United States has participated, with one exception, did not involve a breach of
international law. See supra note 98. In all of those cases, either the asylum state failed

to protest the abduction or asylum state officials participated in the arrest. Therefore, although the courts were correct in relying on the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in exercising jurisdiction, these cases are not inconsistent with the thesis of this Note. The only case in
which there was a breach of international law was the abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machan.

However, in that case, the issue of relying directly on the obligation of customary international law was never raised, as the case was argued in terms of whether the alleged
breach of the extradition treaty defeated the jurisdiction of the court. See United States
v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990), affd sub nom. United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992).
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[t]here are authorities of the highest respectability which hold
that such forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the party
should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the
court ....
However this may be, the decision of that question is as
much within the province of the State court, as a question of
common law, or of the law of nations, of which that court is
bound215to take notice, as it is of the courts of the United
States.
Similarly, the language of Frisbie is no more compelling: "This
Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois... that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not
impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's
jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction."' 216 It would thus
overextend the Ker-Frisbie doctrine to read it as requiring the
exercise of jurisdiction and thereby precluding domestic courts
from applying international law in cases of international abduction."7
A proper reading of the holding of the Court in Paquete Habana would permit domestic courts to order the return of an individual abducted in violation of international law. That is, if U.S.
courts are to "administer" international law, they should effectuate
the full extent of the customary international law remedy and
order the executive to return the individual. It is unlikely, however, that U.S. courts will embrace this view anytime soon. U.S.
courts have been notably reticent to involve themselves in what
they perceive to be the purview of the executive branch. Thus, although it would certainly seem to be within their power to do so,
U.S. courts are unlikely to order the return of an abducted individual based solely on customary international law.218

215. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444 (citations omitted).
216. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522 (emphasis added).
217. For an argument that Ker-Frisbie is inapplicable to cases of international abduction involving a breach of international law, see generally Schwabach & Patchett, supra
note 26, at 21.
218. In 1989, the U.S. Department of Justice issued an internal memorandum that
assessed the power of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to "apprehend and
abduct a fugitive residing in a foreign state when those actions would be contrary to
customary international law." Memorandum from William P. Barr, Authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Override Customary or Other International Law in the
Course of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities 1 (June 21, 1989) (on file with
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A United States court not believing that the holding of
Paquete Habana simply allowed it to order the repatriation of an
abducted individual still might be able to "administer" international law by refusing to exercise jurisdiction over a criminal defendant brought before the court in violation of international law.
Through their supervisory power, federal courts may choose to
219
decline to exercise jurisdiction. In United States v. Toscanino,
the Second Circuit held that it could "rely ... upon [its] supervi-

sory power over the administration of criminal justice" in choosing
to decline to exercise jurisdiction in a case in which the defendant
allegedly had been extensively tortured in the course of an international abduction.' The basis for this supervisory power is that
a court has no obligation to allow itself to become an "accomplicel
in willful disobedience of law."'" This reasoning could be applied
to state-sponsored international abductions generally: recognizing
that these abductions violate some of the most basic norms of
international law and that international custom requires that a
state return an abducted individual, a federal court could use its
supervisory power to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.' The court could thereby facilitate the return of the indi-

Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice). The Barr memorandum concluded
that the Department had "erred" in 1980 in concluding that the FBI lacked such authority. The memorandum concluded first that the FBI could arrest persons even if those
actions violated international law, and second that the President "has inherent constitutional authority to order the FBI to investigate and arrest individuals in a manner that
departs from international law." Id. This opinion, however, does not constitute a contrary
executive decision, because an internal memorandum is not "law" that domestic courts
must apply. This memorandum simply evaluated whether, in the Department's opinion,
"the FBI has legal authority to carry out law enforcement operations that contravene
international law." Id. at 2.
Moreover, in deciding that "legal authority" existed, the memorandum certainly did
not authorize an executive policy of such abductions. Consequently, the courts are not
bound by the Department's conclusions as to the scope of FBI authority. In short, the
Barr memorandum is not an executive act that precludes United States courts from administering customary international law in abduction cases. It is also worth noting that in
the wake of the abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain and the outrage expressed by Mexico,
President Clinton promised not to allow the kidnapping of foreign nationals in the future.
John Guendelsberger, Two Kinds of Federal Kidnapping, THE PLAIN DEALER, July 2,
1993, at 5B.
219. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
220. Id. at 276.
221. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 615 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (quoting
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)), affd sub nom. United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
222. Cf. 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 543, 549 (1980) (noting that the Second Circuit

1994]

INTERNATIONAL ABDUCTION

vidual and bring the United States into conformity with its international law obligations.' Further, if the judiciary were to adopt
this position, it would certainly reduce the likelihood that the
executive would undertake such abductions."' This position
would thus help to support a world order in accord with the rule
of international law and also help to eliminate the political tensions that inevitably accompany such abductions.2
Nonetheless, even if United States courts choose to leave the
responsibility of ensuring compliance with international law to the
executive branch, this does not mean that return is discretionary.
International law obliges the state to return the individual and
specifically addresses neither the executive nor the judiciary.
Whether, in practice, the functional application of this obligation
should lie with the judicial or the executive branch is thus purely a
matter of domestic policy and law.' However, given the unlikelihood that the same executive branch that violated international
law in abducting the individual will abide by its international obligations in terms of returning the individual, the judiciary may be
the more appropriate body to perform this function.
Some may argue that returning an abductee who is accused,
or even indicted, of a crime against the United States is too high a
price to pay in the name of adherence to customary international
"has explicitly declined to define the implications of an international law violation on
criminal jurisdiction" and suggesting that the court might decline jurisdiction based on the
violation of international law).
223. The South African Supreme Court, for example, has held that in cases of a
state-sponsored international abduction, courts should refuse to exercise their criminal
jurisdiction over a defendant. S v. Ebrahim, 1991 (2) SA 553 (S.Afr.), reprinted in S.
Afr. L. Rep. (Apr.-June 1991).
224. Cf. 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 543, 557 (1980) ("Only if foreign nationals, without U.S. direction or compensation, deposited the fugitive on American soil would the
legal problems in this memorandum be obviated by their presence.").
225. The abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain created severe political tension between
the United States and many of its regional neighbors. Mexico, for example, repudiated
the ruling in Alvarez-Machain as "invalid and illegal," and the Jamaican minister for
security and justice denounced the decision as "an atrocity that would disturb the world."
Stewart, supra note 94, at 50.
226. Preuss, for example, writes,
Under the law of a given state the courts may be incompetent to release a
prisoner who has been arrested by state agents in violation of a foreign sovereignty. It does not follow that the arresting state is under no obligation to
restore the prisoner to the state of asylum. Whether the appropriate action is
taken by the judiciary or by the executive department would seem to be purely
a matter of municipal concern.
Preuss, supra note 21, at 505 n.15.

,
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law. However, three reasons temper the acknowledged problem.
First, just as process is important within the reach of the Constitution, process is important outside of it as well. Process does not
suddenly become unimportant simply because the alleged criminal
is not within our borders. The United States should acknowledge
the international community's desire that the transfers of persons
from one country to another be orderly, subject to the consent of
the sovereign powers involved. 7 Second, international agreements can help ensure that alleged criminals will not forever elude
trials. Extradition treaties can be signed that require that the asylum state either extradite or prosecute alleged criminals.2" Third,
international abduction is a two-way street, and a rule that prohibits abduction and requires return protects U.S. citizens at the same
time that it protects foreigners. It helps protect U.S. citizens from
the vagaries of foreign justice systems and foreign criminal codes
that are totally inconsistent with notions of criminal responsibility
in the United States. 2 9
CONCLUSION

Without a doubt, state-sponsored international abductions will
continue in the future as states, frustrated by the inability to punish those they deem deserving, continue to resort to self-help
methods of apprehension. Standing between such states and this
anarchy is the rule of international law. Long experience with
international abductions has led the international community to
develop a customary international law that requires the return of
an abducted individual when the abductor's actions are attributable
to the abducting state, the asylum state does not consent, and the
asylum state demands the return of the individual. Although the
very consistency of state practice attests to the seriousness with
which states view the issue of state-sponsored international abduction, United States jurisprudence has so far failed to acknowledge

227. However, to the extent that the doctrine of self-defense develops to work within
this prohibition of international abduction, a consensus may eventually emerge that permits exactly these types of abduction in cases that can legitimately be defended on the
basis of "self-defense." See Findlay, supra note 9, at 25-33; see supra note 48.
228. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., art. 9, 31 U.S.T. 5059,
5065.
229. See supra note 9.
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the requirements that international law imposes, focusing instead
on the question of jurisdiction alone.
The abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain was probably not the
last time that the United States will violate international law. And
with the United States as the leader, it is only a question of time
before other countries follow. United States courts can administer
international law and stymie this trend toward lawlessness either
by affirmatively ordering the return of abducted individuals or, less
directly, by refusing to recognize jurisdiction in cases when international law has clearly been violated. Indeed, it is ironic that South
Africa is leading the way in such compliance with international
law.' 0 It is time for the United States to conform to the requirements of international law and refrain from undertaking international abductions. Failing this, in cases of international abduction
sponsored by the executive branch, it is time for the United States
judiciary to properly apply international law "as often as questions
depending on it are duly presented for their determinaof right
,,1 31
tion.

230. See supra note 223.
231. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).

